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In South Korea, a unitary form of government offers an 
opportunity to examine the policy distance between the 
national government’s stance on immigration and the atti-
tudes of local officials who work for metropolitan-level gov-
ernments. I examine the impact of local economic market 
needs on local attitudes towards national immigration policy 
through the lens of intergovernmental relations (IGR) and 
Lipsky’s concept of bureaucratic discretion. Comparing two 
cases drawn from local governments in South Korea with 
dissimilar economic bases but similar levels of local autono-
my, I find that economic needs at the local level are linked 
to local immigration policy. Contrary to expectations, the 
cases illustrate the relative importance of fiscal autonomy 
and a new understanding for political autonomy. These cas-
es illustrate the need for caution when applying political and 
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institutional theory within new contexts and offer new varia-
bles for future investigations of local autonomy.
Keywords: immigration, local politics, policy distance, local 
autonomy, intergovernmental relations, local labor mar-
kets, South Korea
1.  Introduction
Immigration, as a policy area of nation-states, is as old an idea as is the idea 
of the nation-state itself. However, the identification of the outsider, or 
those who are not full members of the public realm (Arendt, 1958) is much 
older, and a universal way of defining social groups by categorizing who 
“belongs” and who does not. There is space where these two ideas overlap, 
and it has provided fertile ground for discussions of national identity and 
political rent-seeking, where the mobilization of bias is based upon cleav-
ages defined by “us” and “them” (Schattschneider, 1960). One might ar-
gue that many of the discussions of immigration in recent years have taken 
place within such boundaries (Peberdy, 2009; Gordon, 2016; Jeram, 2014; 
Holtug, Lippert-Rasmusen & Laegaard, 2009; Laegaard, 2009; Hepburn & 
Rosie, 2014). However, it can also be a unique policy arena for examining 
intergovernmental relations, when national policies are carried out at the 
local level of government (Kingdon, 2003; Choi & Wright, 2004; Koprić, 
Lalić Novak & Vukojičić Tomić, 2019). This examination provides an op-
portunity to understand how bureaucratic discretion plays out at the local 
level of government (Lipsky, 1980; Frederickson, 1980).
East Asia is no stranger to such mobilizations. Long dynastic histories 
and regional conflicts have merged national identities and created an in-
ternal politics that often emphasizes a uniqueness of ethnic origin that 
is belied by histories of migrations. Migration between East Asian states 
has been relatively common, as economies have developed at different 
rates, and the demand for labor creates incentives for movement across 
national boundaries. In the aftermath of the Second World War and the 
Korean Conflict, East Asian nations were much more familiar with emi-
gration rather than immigration. As these countries have industrialized, 
the “brain drain” has diminished somewhat, as first more Japanese, then 
more Koreans, and now more Chinese, have opted to return home to pur-
sue careers after being educated abroad. But as these nations have devel-
oped, they have been faced with the same set of challenges that currently 
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characterize Western industrialized nations: falling birth rates; increas-
ingly better educated youth (as a proportion of the population); and dis-
proportionately high unemployment rates for those with college degrees 
(Economist 2017; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific [UNESCAP] 2016). This has changed the domestic 
conversations regarding immigration in a region that has historically been 
politically averse to welcoming “outsiders”. The looming labor shortage 
is one that has already begun to make its presence felt, as countries in 
Southeast Asia, like Malaysia and the Philippines, with a labor surplus, 
have provided a natural impetus for movement in an increasingly glo-
balized economy (The Economist, 2017).
As data from The Economist (2017) indicate, within East Asia, South Korea 
is in particularly tight territory, facing a need for replacing over 30% of its 
current workforce by 2030. With the lowest birth rate of any nation within 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
member states, (OECD 2019), South Korea has begun to create national 
policies over the last ten years specifically designed to address the economic 
consequences of industrialization and global markets (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. EU National Fertility Rates with Focus on Croatia, Japan, and 
South Korea, 1970–2017
Source: OECD 2019, Fertility rates, Total, Children/Women, 1970-2017. Social Welfare 
Statistics: Family Indicators. Data for public use. 
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Immigration policy can provide an apt vehicle for examining how new 
policy types offer opportunities for policy innovation within a unitary gov-
ernment structure. Different regions within South Korea rely on different 
kinds of labor, depending on local market conditions. However, South 
Korea’s government structure poses a problem for studies of national-lo-
cal relations, since it remains a highly centralized state with a unitary 
form of government. Much of the intergovernmental literature is rooted 
in theories that assume a more federated structure, where localities are 
presumed to have some degree of autonomy (Choi & Wright, 2004). In 
South Korea, however, the central government has only recently decen-
tralized authority for decision-making to the local level, so such assump-
tions are not met. However, one may argue that when there is sufficient 
pressure from local level actors to address specific problems, we can ex-
pect to see some deviation from national policy directives. The question 
that remains unanswered by the intergovernmental and decentralization 
literature, is what variables are important in explaining local discretion 
within a unitary structure of government.
Answering such a question has important implications for research cur-
rently conducted in nations that are attempting to transition to more de-
centralized forms of governance (Agranoff, 2004). In Central and Eastern 
Europe, for example, the questions surrounding decentralization often 
focus on the form and function, rather than the underlying assumptions 
about why decentralization might be desirable. Such normative questions 
cannot be answered by simply examining inputs and outputs between 
central and local governments: they must be examined within the context 
of decisions made at both central and local levels as to what is important 
(salient) and what is not (quiescent) (Edelman, 1967). This requires a 
more nuanced examination of conditions so that variables not identified 
by the literature (which tends to be dominated by Western democrat-
ic perspectives) might be observed (Pitschel & Bauer, 2009). Only un-
der such an investigation might we hope to uncover what may be missed 
when applying theories developed within other contexts.
Since South Korea has only recently begun recognizing local government 
authority (since 1998), there is little systematic data available for assess-
ing how national immigration policy is executed at the local level. So to 
answer this question, it would be wise to first establish whether there is 
any difference across local governments in how they approach immigra-
tion policy. For these reasons, this research will be exploratory in nature, 
examining two key cases that are dissimilar in their economic needs and 
orientations, especially with respect to foreign labor needs, but similar 
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in size and population characteristics. This will be done in the follow-
ing stages: first, by establishing the national policy environment in South 
Korea, including a brief explanation of the intergovernmental landscape, 
and how this generally impedes local deviation from national policy; sec-
ond, by explaining the theoretical framework that will be used to assess 
how local governments carry out national policies and under what condi-
tions exceptions from national policy directives might be expected; third, 
by examining two specific cases, immigration policies within Busan and 
Gyeonggi, metropolitan-level governments with dissimilar and similar 
characteristics as mentioned above, to determine to what extent new vari-
ables not indentified in theory may be important in promoting greater ef-
ficiencies at the local level by matching local needs while complying with 
national directives; and then finally, by discussing how such variables may 
offer a new understanding of policy entrepreneurship (Kingdon, 2003), 
and local bureaucratic discretion (Lipsky, 1980), within an intergovern-
mental framework.
2.  National Policy Environment:  
A Brief Policy Review
In order to properly engage with the South Korean model of unitary gov-
ernment, some basic review of historical conditions is necessary. South 
Korea has allowed official local elections since 1991, but nationwide, such 
elections were not held regularly until 1998, after which time elections 
for local city councils and mayors have been held every four years (Ko-
rea Research Institute for Local Administration [KRILA], 2015). Local 
governments in South Korea, however, function largely as administrative 
units that receive both function and structure from the national govern-
ment, and the administrative structures are tasked with providing con-
tinuous public services in key policy areas over time. This link between 
the national and local administrations is largely budgetary, with relatively 
little autonomy exercised over budget revenues or expenditures at the lo-
cal level (KRILA, 2015). Political power is therefore often exercised at 
the periphery of national policy, rather than over central funding issues 
(Lee & Tao, 2012; Tao, 2016), and in South Korea, central funding issues 
are education, national parks and public lands, agriculture, fisheries and 
forestry, and planning and public transportation (Lee & Tao, 2012). Im-
migration as a policy area, as mentioned above, is relatively new, and falls 
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roughly within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. Immigration in 
South Korea defines someone’s legal right to reside, work, or participate 
in South Korean affairs (Ministry of Justice, 2007). Thus, it does not oc-
cupy a berth on the ship of ongoing central policy issues. This means that 
it also can be a political football, getting kicked about on the periphery if 
there is political rent to be sought.
This peripheral space is also where local-national politics can have the 
greatest play, where the size and shape of the space is defined by the at-
tention paid to the public issue by the national government. The history of 
immigration policy in South Korea is short and dynamic, shifting rapidly 
from periods of emigration to immigration. In the early to mid-1980s, 
South Korea sent, on average, 30,000 workers abroad each year to work 
for Korean conglomerates (Kim, 2009). For Korean men, especially those 
over the age of fifty-five, many have memories of living overseas as foreign 
laborers, where they spent a good portion of their youth working in occu-
pations known as the 3-D’s (difficult, dirty, and dangerous) (Kim, 2009) 
outside of their home country. However, this changed quickly in the late 
1980s, when a construction boom, driven partly by the run-up to South 
Korea hosting the Olympics in 1988, created new, better-paying jobs that 
pulled workers out of factories. This caused a labor shortage for industry, 
estimated by the national government to be a deficit of approximately 
100,000 workers, and a country that was a labor exporter became a labor 
importer virtually overnight (Kim, 2009; Kim & Kwon, 2012).
This sudden shift brought many of the overseas Koreans home, but the 
need for foreign labor continued (Stratfor, 2017). As a relatively small 
country surrounded by economic giants (the well-developed economy of 
Japan, and the waking behemoth, China), South Korea pursued an ex-
port-driven, middle-way approach toward economic development (Kim 
& Kwon, 2012). This meant that large corporations, or the family-run 
chaebols, like Samsung and Hyundai, were constantly looking for ways 
to keep themselves financially nimble in order to compete international-
ly. This drove a move toward sub-contracting and market segmentation, 
which continues to be an issue today. These practices involve large corpo-
rations contracting out their less-desirable, labor-intensive work to smaller 
firms (those with fewer than 30 employees), and retaining higher-pay-
ing, white-collar jobs within their corporate umbrella group. Thus, the 
demand for imported labor generally came from smaller firms, who could 
no longer draw on rural migrants or younger workers, as the country’s 
youth became better educated (Kim & Kwon, 2012). Korea’s first call 
for migrant labor came from smaller companies who held (or were vying 
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for) contracts with the titans of the South Korean economy, and the call 
was for low-skilled workers. And those who were encouraged to answer 
the call were primarily ethnic Koreans from China (Kim & Kwon, 2012; 
United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF], 2013), or immigrants from 
other East Asian countries. This situation has become somewhat more 
diverse over time, for reasons that will be outlined below, but the greatest 
source of legal migrant workers to Korea remains those who have ethnic 
ties to the Korean peninsula (see Table 1).
Table 1. Foreign Residents by Country of Origin, 2014–2018
Country of 
Origin
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
China 898,654 955,871 1,016,607 1,018,074 1,070,566
(Ethnic Korean 
Chinese)1 (590,856) (626,655) (627,004) (679,729) (708,082)
Vietnam 129,973 136,758 149,384 169,738 196,633
Thailand 94,314 93,348 100,860 153,259 197,764
United States 136,663 138,660 140,222 143,568 151,018
Uzbekistan 43,852 47,103 54,490 62,870 68,433
Philippines 53,538 54,977 56,980 58,480 60,139
Cambodia 38,395 43,209 45,832 47,105 47,012
Mongolia 24,561 30,527 35,206 45,744 46,286
Russia 14,425 19,384 32,372 44,851 54,064
Japan 49,152 47,909 51,297 53,670 60,878
Indonesia 46,945 46,538 47,606 45,328 47,366
Nepal 26,790 30,185 34,108 36,627 40,456
Taiwan 31,200 30,002 34,003 36,168 41,306
Sri Lanka 26,057 26,678 27,650 26,916 25,828
Canada 24,353 25,177 26,107 25,692 25,934
Myanmar 15,921 19,209 22,455 24,902 28,074
Bangladesh 14,644 14,849 15,482 16,066 16,641
Pakistan 11,209 11,987 12,639 12,697 13,275
1 The count for Ethnic Koreans is included in the total count for Chinese immigrants, 
so it is not reflected in the overall total.
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India 10,196 10,414 10,515 11,244 11,945
Australia 12,468 12,303 13,870 13,008 14,279
Hong Kong 7,398 7,275 7,180 6,727 6,972
United Kingdom 10,762 13,506 16,728 13,303 12,119
New Zealand 4,593 4,744 4,906 4,884 5,072
Other 71,555 78,906 92,942 109,577 125,547
Total 1,797,618 1,899,519 2,049,441 2,180,498 2,367,607
Source: Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, Republic of Korea, 2018. Data compiled 
by the author from source.
Agreement about who should come to Korea and for how long was not 
reached at the national level until 2003 (Park, 2017). At this time the 
trainee programs initially offered by the central government under the 
Kim Young-Sam administration in 1994 to control the influx of migrants 
from countries outside of East Asia were finally ended. The programs had 
been established to regulate the number and origin of migrants, but since 
so very few migrants were allowed to stay legally for any period of time 
under the program, employers would often “forget” to renew visas, thus 
leading to burgeoning numbers of migrant workers remaining long past 
their initial visa period (Torneo, 2016; Torneo and Yang, 2015). In 2002, 
nearly 70% of South Korea’s foreign workforce were staying in the country 
illegally, which indicated that no one’s needs were being met; neither the 
companies’ that required foreign labor to survive nor the foreign workers’ 
employed under often exploitative conditions (Park, 2017). Many of the 
smaller firms, who needed labor to keep up with the fast pace of growth, 
would offer temporary positions to visitors from Southeast and South Asia 
without applying for permission from the government, since rules were 
arcane and quotas were severely limited. This meant that most migrant 
labor entered the country on a tourist visa and then simply overstayed 
the limits of the visa (Park, 2017). In 2003, the outgoing Kim Dae-Jung 
administration tackled the thorny issue of immigration and created the 
Employment Permit System (EPS), which offered illegal migrants the 
opportunity to enroll in a guest worker program for the first time. Thus 
between 2002 and 2003, the population of legal immigrants jumped by 
57.2 percent (Park, 2017).
Since that time, the government has turned to immigration policy to ad-
dress a number of growing concerns with the Korean labor market. The 
most pressing issues at present are the rock-bottom birth rate, and the 
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need for two different types of labor: unskilled, since young Koreans are 
increasingly unwilling to take positions that their parents deem “unfit 
given their level of education”; and highly skilled in professional areas 
(finance, research and design, and professions requiring high fluency in 
English) (Oh et al., 2012). For technical fields, the rate of vacancy re-
quiring foreign professionals to compensate for gaps in the local labor 
markets can vary considerably. In 2012, for example, the shortage rate for 
technical workers in the steel industry was over five times the rate in the 
semiconductor industry (6.3% to 1.7%, respectively) (Oh et al., 2012).
Since the labor market has different needs, the national government has 
come up with two major programs for bringing in and managing foreign 
labor: the General Employment Permit Visa Program; and the Working 
Visit Visa Program. The first targets non-Korean low-skilled or unskilled 
labor from fifteen approved countries: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, 
East Timor, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lan-
ka, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam (Minis-
try of Justice, 2007). This group of migrant labor is generally given an E-9 
visa, and must pass a Korean language proficiency test in order to qualify 
for employment. The latter is for ethnic Koreans born or living overseas, 
who are willing to take unskilled labor jobs, and who are generally issued 
H-2 visas. Both were designed to be short-term programs, giving those 
who met the selection criteria visas of limited duration (for the General 
Employment Permit Visa Program, one year or less, with the possibility 
of renewal or extension, but with a three-year cap; the latter up to 22 
months, with the possibility of renewal or extension, but with a five-year 
cap). This short-term focus ensured that the migrant community did not 
set down roots, and this has led to difficulty for some employers in keep-
ing high quality workers (Oh et al., 2012).
In 2012, at the end of the Lee Myeong Bak administration, the problem 
of continuity was addressed with the introduction of the “Sincere Worker 
Re-Entry System”, which allowed for longer stays for “sincere” workers. A 
sincere worker was an E-9 visa holder identified by his or her employer 
as a crucial part of the employer’s labor force. The influx of workers from 
this category can be seen in Table 2. Over time, the number of returning 
workers has risen, which means that the average stay for what used to be 
considered a “temporary” worker has increased to well over five years for 
unskilled labor. As of 2018, the Korean government still prohibits foreign 
workers in these categories from bringing family members to the country, 
so there is still a reluctance to allow immigrants who are not ethnically 
Korean to settle in Korea.
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Table 2. Low-Skilled Workers in South Korea by Visa Type after Commence-








Total Authorized Foreign 
Workers
2011 234,295 ---- 303,368 1,117,481
2012 230,237  1,853 238,765 1,120,599
2013 246,695  7,021 240,178 1,219,192
2014 270,569  8,834 282,670 1,377,965
2015 276,042 12,090 285,342 1,465,873
Source: Ministry of Justice (2017). Immigration Service Employment Permit System. Data 
compiled by the author from source.
This ambivalence towards foreign workers and immigration is not uniform. 
There are generational differences, as mentioned previously, and in rural 
parts of Korea, the importance of foreign brides in overcoming the gender 
imbalances in a country that prefers male children cannot be overstated. 
Since the 1990s, foreign spouses have comprised roughly 13% of all immi-
grants, and this category has often dominated policy planning and budg-
etary concerns. For example, in the metropolitan city of Incheon, foreign 
spouses make up 20% of all foreigners residing in the city, but they receive 
50% of the budget for immigrant-related purposes (Oh et al., 2012; Han, 
2010). The rise in the number of children who are born to a non-Korean 
parent has been steady, leading to a relatively new focus on what the gov-
ernment calls “multiculturalism” (Kim, 2010; Watson, 2012). The emphasis 
on creating more Korean families rather than on issues related to migrant 
labor can be seen by examining policies over time, as illustrated in Table 3.
Table 3. History of Multiculturalism Policies in South Korea
Year Multiculturalism-related policies and laws
1988 Approved participants from socialist countries entering the nation for the 
1988 Seoul Olympics.
1991 Introduced local subsidiaries training system for firms that wished to hire mi-
grant workers.
1992 Joined the UN, established diplomatic ties with China, liberalized overseas travel.
1994 Introduced the industrial technology training system nationwide.
1995 Declared Globalisation (by the civilian government) as a desirable policy.
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1996 Joined the OECD.
1997 Adopted the bilineal jus sanguinis principle following the constitutional dis-
cordance adjudication on the patrilineal jus sanguinis of the Nationality Act.
1999 Enacted the Overseas Koreans Act.
2001 Set up guidelines on guaranteeing the right to education of illegal immigrant 
workers’ children (primary school).
2003 Simplified international marriages by abrogating the Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) between Korea and China.
2004 Presented the cultural vision of the nation through Creative Korea by the 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism, abolished the industrial training system, 
implemented the employment permit system.
2005 Raised the issue of social integration against polarization (by Presidential 
Committee on Social Inclusion), studied the policy direction for establishing 
multi-cultural policies and cultural support strategies, guaranteed the right to 
education of undocumented immigrant children according to the recommen-
dation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (secondary school).
2006 Held high-level immigrant policy meeting, adopted the Social integration sup-
port policy and Resident foreigners support ordinance, enacted the Frame-
work Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea, 
established the education support plan for the children from multi-cultural 
families, set up the National Center for Multi-cultural Education in the Seoul 
National University.
2007 Launched the Korea Immigration Service of the Ministry of Justice, enacted the 
Framework Act on Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea.
2008 Enacted the Multi-cultural Families Support Act, established the Basic 
Plan for Immigration Policy, announced the strategy for attracting global 
high-quality human resources (by the National Competitiveness Commit-
tee), announced the measure for extending the customized support for each 
stage of life cycle for multi-cultural families, abolished the system on the head 
of family, enacted the regulation on the social integration program for immi-
grants and the operation of that program.
2009 Made the recommendation on guaranteeing the right to education for undoc-
umented immigrant children (secondary education), organized the multi-cul-
tural forum for members of the National Assembly for enacting the frame-
work act on multiculturalism, launched the Social Integration Committee, 
implemented the system of completing the courses of the Korea Immigration 
& Integration Program (KIIP).
2010 Established the Basic Plan for Policies to Support Multi-cultural Families, 
expressed opinions on the partial revision of the Enforcement Decree of the 
Act on Regulation of Marriage Brokerage Agency.
2011 Made the recommendation on improving the human rights of stateless per-
sons due to a sham marriage.
Source: Adapted from Kang and Yoo (2011, p. 46), by the author to focus on immigration-re-
lated policies.
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As outlined in Table 3, there is often a reshaping of immigration poli-
cy during the last year of the presidency. Since Korean presidents are 
term-limited (one term of five years), the last year is the opportunity to 
pursue policies that may be unpopular but necessary for pursuing broad-
er public interest goals. The “lame duck” status of the last year is not as 
debilitating for the Korean presidency as it may be elsewhere, since the 
executive branch in Korea is relatively powerful, and can act unilaterally 
in a number of ways. Border protection and national economic concerns 
fall into these categories, and thus immigration is a logical area of focus. 
What is interesting about immigration as a policy issue is the lack of sali-
ence in any political party’s platform within South Korea. There is virtual 
silence about immigration as a policy area, outside of some concerns with 
the treatment of defectors and refugees from North Korea (Park, 2017).
3.  The Role of Local Governments and 
Intergovernmental Relations in Shaping 
Immigration Policy
Since immigration policy is still evolving at the national level, it has not 
received its own space in the central government’s organizational universe 
(see Figure 2). Technically, policy is centralized in the Immigrants’ Policy 
Committee under the Ministry of Justice, and the different programmatic 
approaches are dispersed throughout the national government (Korean 
Immigration Service, 2014). This means that policies are farmed out to 
the ministries that may be best equipped to implement the particulars of 
the policy in question. So, for example, support for multicultural families 
is sent to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, while the welfare 
of immigrants and their children is dealt with through the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, and Immigrants’ Settlement Support is done through 
the Ministry of the Interior and local governments. Thus a single issue, 
such as education of children from multicultural families in public schools 
might not have a clear ministerial home. 
Such deconstruction is also evident at the local level of government, which 
often mirrors, at least structurally, the national level, as one might expect 
in a unitary form of government. City governments have central admin-
istrations, but most services are provided at the district level (구 or gu). 
This is because the gu office is responsible for registering residents, and 
residency confers access to certain amenities and services, such as public 
school registration. In this regard, immigrants are treated exactly like their
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Figure 2. Ministerial Jurisdiction over Immigration Policy in South Korea
Source: Ministry of Justice, 2015. p. 3. For public use. 
Korean neighbors, which can prove to be both helpful (everyone faces 
exactly the same circumstances), and impossible (without prior knowl-
edge of rules or mastery of the Korean language, immigrants are often not 
privy to the same information their neighbors have). Thus issues that are 
unique to immigrants may not be addressed directly by the city central 
government, but rather by the district that happens to have foreign resi-
dents (Incheon City Government, 2015).
Hence immigration policy falls into a nether region within the national 
policy rubric, where we might expect the central government’s guidelines 
for how to address immigration issues to vary considerably, from broad 
and incomplete, to highly focused and narrow, when certain areas of 
policy are judged to be more pressing (see Table 3). Local governments, 
which often find themselves on the front lines of service delivery, there-
fore become the de facto arbiters of what immigration policy is in South 
Korea. The street-level bureaucrats, as Lipsky (1980) might argue, are 
those civil servants serving in the gu offices, who decide how to construct 
policy based upon the kinds of clients they serve.
Intergovernmental relations (IGR) in East Asia, and specifically in South 
Korea, as outlined by Choi and Wright (2004), have evolved over time, 
shifting from a heavy-handed, highly centralized, and militaristic govern-
ing approach to a more politically decentralized and democratic approach 
that relies increasingly on local governments as partners rather than 
pawns (Choi & Wright, 2004, p. 3). According to the IGR model, there 
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are institutional and behavioral factors that come into play in determining 
the type of the relationship between the center and the peripheral gov-
ernments. The relationship between the central and local governments in 
South Korea is by no means equal, as illustrated by the budgetary control 
still exercised by the central government. With discretion over only 25 
percent of their budgets, local governments have limited opportunities to 
flex their policy muscles.
The institutional factors from IGR include the legal framework that binds 
national and local officials, e.g. constitutional or legislative tenets. The be-
havioral factors encompass those variables that may affect “the attitudes 
and actions of public officials … operating in other political jurisdictions” 
(Choi & Wright, 2004, p. 2). Of particular interest is the fiscal relation-
ship between the national and local governments, and the interaction with 
other institutions, such as political parties. However, the assumptions of 
this model include a more autonomous role for local governments than is 
generally the case in a unitary environment (Tao, 2016). If local govern-
ments lack fiscal autonomy, then the IGR model posits that other institu-
tions, like political parties, and behavioral factors, such as the prevalence 
(or lack) of networks between officials at different government levels, 
become more important (Agranoff, 2004). In studies of newly decentral-
ized governments, where self-rule has become possible, fiscal autonomy is 
generally recognized as crucial to the exercise of bureaucratic discretion.
However, there is little discussion of how local governments implement 
national policy when there are clear differences between the central and 
the local levels. These differences might be attitudinal, where the needs 
of the local community differ from those recognized and supported at 
the national level. The differences might also be institutional, where the 
ruling political party at the national level may not be as well represented at 
the local level. In his discussion of newly decentralized nations, Agranoff 
outlines clear distinctions between devolution of authority, where self-rule 
of a sub-unit of the national government is granted, and power sharing, as 
outlined by Elazar (1987), which is often associated with the IGR model 
(Agranoff, 2004, p. 28) and federalist systems. The expectations of both 
rest heavily on the two issues of fiscal autonomy and political independ-
ence. If neither is present, then the local government will not be expected 
to deviate much from national directives.
In South Korea, the unitary structure of government dominates discus-
sions of local autonomy, with many scholars pointing to the lack of fiscal 
autonomy in particular as a measure of centralization (Lee & Tao, 2012; 
Moon, 1999; Kwon, 2003; Kim, 2016; Choi & Wright, 2004). However, 
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there is also acknowledgement that the level of fiscal autonomy varies 
considerably across local government units. If fiscal autonomy is meas-
ured as the ratio of own-source revenues to total revenues, the range can 
be as broad as 21 (very low autonomy) to 60 (medium-high autonomy) 
(Choi & Wright, 2004). Thus, one might argue that in a locality with high-
er fiscal autonomy, there will be a higher likelihood that local policies may 
diverge somewhat from national policies, even within a unitary system. 
The chance of this happening in a policy area that is within the national 
government’s zone of indifference should also be high.
Additionally, South Korean scholars point to the development of demo-
cratic institutions and norms as a potential catalyst for greater local auton-
omy. As Choi and Wright (2004) state: “The extension of voting for local 
councils and executive heads certainly assisted in associating democracy 
with local autonomy. This link seems solidified and indirectly supported 
by the now-established pattern of open and competitive national elec-
tions … since 1987” (p. 10). This idea is further supported by scholar-
ship that highlights South Korean “regionalism”, where different regions 
of the country show strong support for particular political parties (Lee & 
Hwang, 2012). Thus, when voter turnout in particular regions is high, the 
national ruling party (the winner of the presidency) may shift, causing 
realignments with local governments that either support or oppose the 
new ruling party. This has happened many times in the local and national 
elections since 1987 (Lee & Hwang, 2012), which means that there is an 
opportunity to see whether political parties can either enforce or weaken 
national policy initiatives at the local level. 
4.  Research Questions, Design, Data Collection, 
and Expectations
The literature on IGR and local autonomy makes clear that we should 
expect local governments to respond to fiscal and institutional constraints 
set at the national level. But to what degree are local variables important 
in pushing policy behavior either toward or away from national directives? 
And which local variables are important? The IGR literature argues that 
many variables come into play at the local level, such as bureaucratic 
discretion (for administrators), political party affiliation (for elected of-
ficials), and policy issues that have fiscal consequences (Choi & Wright, 
2004). However, these are expectations derived from a largely Western 
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(e.g. U.S.-based) set of institutions. Are there other variables that we 
might be missing if we are using these models in non-Western settings, 
like South Korea?
The answers to such questions cannot be given by simply applying an 
IGR framework to South Korean national-local networks. Discovering 
new variables requires a more qualitative approach to investigation, or 
a “case-oriented” approach (Ragin, 1987). The key to this approach is 
summed up as follows:
[T]he relations between the parts of a whole are understood within the 
context of the whole, not within the context of general patterns of co-
variation between variables characterizing the members of a population 
of comparable units. Second, causation is understood conjuncturally. 
Outcomes are analyzed in terms of intersections of conditions, and it is 
usually assumed that any of several combinations of conditions might 
produce a certain outcome. (p. x). 
If we investigate two South Korean local government cases that are sim-
ilar across variables assumed important within the context of the IGR 
framework, yet that exhibit different outcomes, we may determine, to 
some extent, viable local variables that help explain, either alone or in 
conjunction, the differences across cases. Such identification may prove 
valuable for other researchers attempting to investigate local government 
behavior within the context of autonomy. It may also help those who are 
interested in how IGR works within a unitary system of government that 
is in transition toward a more decentralized form.
To examine how local governments navigate policy implementation in a 
unitary system, we are looking within a policy area that is unsettled at the 
national level as determined above: immigration. We will examine and 
compare two cases that represent different points on the spectrum of con-
ditions for the two most important variables of interest as identified in the 
literature: fiscal autonomy and political autonomy. 
In South Korea, local governments are divided into categories according 
to size and recognized status from the national government. Metropolitan 
city level governments (광역시 or gwangyeoksi) are those that have more 
than one million residents, and their status is identical to provincial gov-
ernments. Not all local governments with more than one million residents 
are designated as metropolitan cities: the local government must petition 
for this status, and be granted the status by the national government. 
There are currently eight (8) metropolitan cities including Seoul, which 
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has special status as the capital city (and by far, the largest population 
center in South Korea with approximately 10 million residents). There are 
eight (8) provincial governments and the special provincial government of 
Jeju Province. All together this brings the total up to seventeen (17) local 
governments with some autonomy in making policy decisions. 
Case selection was determined in part by establishing two local jurisdic-
tions with similar political alignments with the national ruling party (cur-
rently the Democratic Party of South Korea, 민주당 or minjudang), and 
similar levels of fiscal autonomy. The latter variable proved to be more 
definitive in case selection, as illustrated in Table 4. Seoul City and Sejong 
City were eliminated from consideration because of their special status as 
capital cities; they have statutory and regulatory powers that other local 
governments do not have, so measures of local autonomy would not be 
comparable. For similar reasons, Jeju Autonomous Province was also not 
included. Since cities and provinces often have different needs of their 
workforces, choosing one from each would help us to identify a broader 
range of variables when local autonomy might prove important to deter-
mining local policy decisions. Table 4 is therefore divided into two parts: 
the top half contains cities, and the bottom half contains provinces, but 
all are treated at equal administrative levels by the national government.
The measure of local political autonomy is the proportion of local council 
seats held by the ruling party in the last set of local elections in June of 
2018 (National Election Commission, 2018), and the measure of fiscal 
autonomy is the ratio of local revenues to national revenues in the local 
budget, averaged over a three-year period (Kim, 2016). Therefore, the 
higher the measure of political autonomy, the greater the expectation that 
the local government will mirror national policies; the higher the meas-
ure of fiscal autonomy, the lower the expectation that the local govern-
ment will conform to national policy expectations. As the data in Table 
4 demonstrates, we could choose pairs based on their deviation from the 
group as a whole (dissimilarities, or unlikes, using Ragin’s (1987) termi-
nology), or on their convergence with the group (similarities). For exam-
ple, Daegu and Gyeongsangbuk (highlighted boxes) have similarly low 
political autonomy scores, since both districts hold a sizeable majority of 
opposition party representatives. However, Daegu is actually located ad-
jacent to Gyeongsangbuk, and historically, the two share political cultures 
as well as economic conditions. So using such a pair for comparison would 
probably be less fruitful than choosing a pair that has more distance be-
tween the cases. For these reasons, the closest match across both varia-
bles is between Busan (among cities) and Gyeonggi (among provinces). 
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Source: Data compiled by the author from KOSIS (2019).
4.1.  Assessing Variables for Comparison
In order to determine the nature of immigration policy focus at the local 
level, we must first decide how such policy can be assessed. Each met-
ropolitan city and provincial government produce their own guidelines 
for foreigners residing within their jurisdictions, and these offer a view 
of where a particular local government focuses its attention with respect 
to immigrant issues. The variation in guidelines and how they are made 
available to different immigrant groups is available online as part of South 
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Korea’s Government-to-Citizen initiative (or G2C). Local governments 
provide their official information through individually tailored websites. 
Our two cases are quite distinct. The City of Busan is a major port city on 
the southern coast of Korea, and Gyeonggi Province is the province sur-
rounding Seoul City and Incheon City, which borders the Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ) and North Korea. These two jurisdictions represent quite 
distinct economic, political, and social areas. Busan faces Japan and serves 
as the major point of contact for trade and tourism; Gyeonggi serves as a 
bedroom community to the greater Seoul/Incheon metropolitan area and 
also serves as the gateway to both China, on its west coast, and North 
Korea. By focusing on these two local governments, a preliminary model 
for future research can be built. 
In order to gather data from both jurisdictions, each website was evalu-
ated to ascertain the breadth of information offered. This was done using 
the following framework for assessment: 1) what policy areas were cov-
ered (e.g. how many and how diverse); 2) what was the depth of infor-
mation provided; 3) were people encouraged to visit local offices or call 
for more information, or was the information provided online sufficient; 
4) were people offered a way to interact online so that more information 
could be obtained; and 5) how user-friendly were the sites (e.g. was infor-
mation offered in multiple languages; was the same information offered 
in each language; were opportunities to sign up for information on events, 
etc. made available on-line)? This information provides three separate 
measures of local government responsiveness: policy breadth (does the 
local government have plans in place to address the different areas of 
immigrant needs); policy distance (how much difference lies between the 
local government’s approach to immigration and that of the national gov-
ernment); and responsiveness (how responsive does the local government 
appear to be towards its immigrant community needs). These different 
constructs are outlined in Table 5.
Table 5. Constructs and Potential Variables
Construct Type Construct Possible Variable
Dependent 
Policy breadth Policy areas represented at the local level




Deviation from peer groups (similar 
across autonomy variables)
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Proportion of Council Members 
belonging to Presidential Party
Economic Influence Proportion of industries that hire 
foreigners
Types of industry that hire foreigners
Social influence Proportion of foreigners living in 
jurisdiction
Source: Author 
Data for local government immigration policy was collected from each local 
government website developed specifically to serve its foreign residents. Bu-
san Metropolitan City (the second largest city in South Korea at 3.4 million 
people (KOSIS, 2018)); and, Gyeonggi Province, which is the most heavily 
populated province in South Korea, containing roughly 12.6 million people 
(KOSIS, 2018), are two of the most heavily populated areas in the country, 
and as mentioned, they are located at different points of entry to South Ko-
rea: Busan is in the south, and has traditionally been the gateway from Japan 
and parts of southeast Asia. Gyeonggi Province is in the north, and is the tra-
ditional entry point from China and more western parts of Asia (Uzbekistan, 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Pakistan). Busan is a metropolitan city, and therefore 
has little jurisdiction over issues such as agriculture or forestry; its economic 
concerns are shipping, fishing, construction, and manufacturing. It has also 
been losing population, just as Gyeonggi has grown. Gyeonggi Province con-
tains large expanses of undeveloped rural areas, yet also serves as a bedroom 
community to the ever-growing population of workers in Seoul and Incheon, 
so its economic concerns are more varied. An in-depth examination of their 
respective internet websites for foreign residents offers insight into how they 
see themselves addressing immigration policy at the local level.
4.1.1. Busan Metropolitan City. The Busan Metropolitan government has two 
main subsidiaries that address the needs of foreign residents: the first is the 
Busan Foundation for International Cooperation (BFIC), an umbrella or-
ganization that covers all things “foreign” that live or work in Busan (Busan 
Metropolitan Government, 2018); the second is the Busan Foreign Workers 
Support Center (BFWSC), whose mandate is focused entirely on foreign 
workers and their needs. What is immediately striking about the difference 
between the two sets of services are the languages that are offered for the two 
websites: the BFIC can be read in English, Japanese, and simple and complex 
Chinese; the BFWSC can be read in Korean, English, Chinese, Vietnamese, 
and Burmese. Second, there is far more information available on the first site 
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(BFIC), than on the second (BFWSC). The latter only contains directions on 
how to get to the physical office, and outlines its official purpose: “to recover 
the rights of migrant workers by solving the problems migrant workers get 
while living and working in Korea, through counseling and to contribute so-
cial integration of Korea by improving human rights of migrant workers and 
communication between migrant workers and Koreans” (Busan Metropoli-
tan Government, 2018). The first site contains multiple services that might 
be useful to someone living in Korea: information on housing, banking, how 
to master the transportation system, language services for non-native speak-
ers, medical services, education, sports activities, and safety. The first site 
also contains all information geared towards “multicultural families”, which 
apparently does not include any of the immigrant groups from Southeast 
Asia that are included in the second site. The exception is for Chinese from 
mainland China (simplified Chinese). 
4.1.2. Local Immigration Officials and Bureaucratic Discretion. Lipsky (1980) 
noted that officials on the front lines of service delivery in large, bureaucratic 
organizations often shaped public opinion of government in important ways. 
They were able to do so because of the bureaucratic paradox; as the public 
agency increased in size, the likelihood that “street level” bureaucrats would 
receive conflicting orders from higher levels within the organization increased. 
When the policy area in question was politically salient, but the conditions 
of the clientele remained constant, Lipsky found that street level bureaucrats 
often exercised their own discretion in carrying out policy initiatives. This is 
something we might expect to see as an important variable in local immi-
gration policy implementation in a unitary system. However, South Korea 
engages in a practice that reduces the potential for bureaucratic discretion: 
local civil servants are rotated on a regular basis between positions, so even 
if a local official cultivates useful policy practices, these may not remain once 
they are rotated out of their position (Kim, 2016). Likewise, if a local official 
is particularly poor in their execution of policy practices, they may not be in 
their position long enough to either help or harm their clientele. This practice 
increases the importance of national policy at the local level, and is one tool 
that reduces the exercise of local bureaucratic discretion.
4.1.3. Gyeonggi Province. As expected, the bulk of services provided to for-
eigners by Gyeonggi Province is related to multicultural families, and with a 
misrepresentation of the law on their site (Gyeonggi Provincial Government, 
2018). According to the National Assembly (see Table 3), in 1997, laws re-
garding who was eligible to become a Korean national through birth were 
amended to include children whose fathers were not Korean; previously, all 
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children with non-Korean fathers were prohibited from being recognized as 
Korean nationals. Given the history of foreign occupation in Korea, and in 
particular the practice of “comfort women” by Japanese soldiers, legal in-
stitutions bore the marks of this occupation for many decades (Kim, 2010; 
Kim, 2018). But for Gyeonggi to continue this tradition speaks to its highly 
conservative nature, that runs counter to its current political configurations. 
Additionally, the range of services offered is relatively limited, focusing for 
the most part on integrating families into a Korean system, in compliance 
with “multiculturalism”. However, the range of languages offered to for-
eign workers in Gyeonggi is much greater: English, Chinese (simplified), 
Japanese, Vietnamese, Mongolian, Nepali, Indonesian, Thai, Uzbek, 
Bengali, Khmer, Sinhala, Russian, and Burmese. There is no information, 
for example, on housing, safety, or sports, which is to be expected in a 
more suburban/rural environment. But the range of nationalities rep-
resented demonstrates the breadth of possible vocations that are being 
filled by foreigners within Gyeonggi Province, ranging from profession-
al services to manufacturing and manual labor in rural areas that is no 
longer sought by Koreans. This differs substantially from the more limited 
range indicated within Busan. Additionally, the combined information for 
multicultural families and that available for workers offers more specific, 
work-related data for foreign residents than does Busan’s website. 
4.1.4. Data Measurement and Analysis. As illustrated in Table 5, there are 
three separate potential dependent variables to test for different types of 
responsiveness to immigrant populations that also help shed light on local 
autonomy. In order to see whether there is responsiveness at the local lev-
el to changes in conditions, these variables for local governments should 
ideally be captured over time. However, since local governments do not 
archive their data, capturing changes in policy over time requires captur-
ing published changes within the public domain. This is one area where 
the South Korean government’s activities remain relatively opaque. As 
rules change, which can be done by local officials if they obtain consent 
from national administrators, how rules change is documented in an ad 
hoc way. A local official creates a document that instructs future officials 
in how to carry out the new rule. It does not necessarily reference the old 
rule, or why the old rule required modification.2 Thus a snapshot in time 
is the sum of what can be captured with respect to policy changes. 
2 Interview with local government official (2018). Incheon National University, 
Incheon, Republic of Korea.
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To examine how this might look, Figure 3 and Table 6 present the data 
from Busan and Gyeonggi together so that differences may be examined. 
Figure 3 looks at the political parties and representation in both the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches of local. The first item to note is that 
both jurisdictions were part of the “Blue Wave” of 2018, where the for-
mer ruling party of impeached President Park Geun Hye was soundly 
trounced at the polls throughout local government elections nationwide. 
The Democratic Party took both the executive and legislative branches 
from the former New World Party (Saenuri Dang) in Busan and in Gyeo-
nggi, by surprisingly large margins. This demonstrates the strength of the 
national government over local politics in South Korea, despite decades of 
attempts at decentralization. Changes at the top are generally followed by 
changes at the local level, and this applies equally to partisan politics and 
administrative behavior. What is especially noteworthy about this partisan 
shift is the focus on labor policy. The new ruling Democratic Party plac-
es heavy emphasis on providing employment security for labor, and this 
sometimes puts the party at odds with immigrant advocacy groups who 
represent imported labor, especially if that labor is viewed as replacing 
native Koreans. 
Figure 3. Comparison of Busan and Gyeonggi Political Characteristics
Legislative and Executive Party Representation:
 – Democratic Party     – Liberty Party
Busan City Council (2018 elections)                   Busan Mayor,   
Keo-don OH (2018)
Source: By 사:밥풀떼기 – parliament diagram tool부산광역시의회 정당, Public Domain, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=70455755
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Gyeonggi Provincial Council  Gyeonggi Governor, 
(2018 elections)    Jae-myung LEE (2018)3
Source: By – parliament diagram tool, 퍼블릭 도메인, Public Domain. https://commons.wiki-
media.org/w/index.php?curid=70459215
Given that there is little political distinction between Busan and Gyeong-
gi and the national administration, we might expect relatively similar ap-
proaches to immigration policy. However, as demonstrated by the differ-
ences noted in the websites earlier, this is not the case. Therefore, it would 
be interesting to compare the other independent variables identified in 
Table 5 to see whether the distinction in policy approaches lies in the 
social and/or economic realms. Table 6 provides a cursory comparison.












Busan 3,519,401 43,734 (1.2) 20,944 (0.5) 7083 (0.2)











Busan 6132 (0.2) 421 (0.00) 144,758 (4.1) 8
Gyeonggi 3107 (0.03) 4082 (0.03) 884,397 (7.2) 14
Source: Data compiled by the author from Korean Statistical Information Service, 2018
3 Editor’s note: pictures published upon author’ request. 
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When placed side by side, we can immediately see the difference that 
numbers make for policy diversity. In Gyeonggi, where foreign workers 
make up a much greater proportion of the overall population, and where 
the relative importance of agriculture and manufacturing is much higher 
than in Busan, the local government has responded by creating more ser-
vices and by trying to accommodate a broader range of foreign workers 
than is the case in Busan. Although foreign labor still represents a relative-
ly small proportion of the labor force in South Korea, thus providing very 
little threat to the local workforce in terms of job replacement, the nation-
al government still views foreign labor as a potentially destabilizing force 
(Jang, 2015). It is still remarkably difficult to get a visa to work inside 
South Korea, with industries often petitioning the national government 
directly for leniency in applying strict entrance requirements on potential 
workers. Thus local governments have had to adapt national policies to 
address local circumstances, as demonstrated by the different approaches 
taken by the two cases outlined here. So even in a unitary government, 
centralized rules can be customized at the local level. 
Additionally, since both these cases have relatively high levels of fiscal 
autonomy (over 50% local revenue), and relatively low political autonomy, 
the customizing that has taken place seems to indicate that fiscal auton-
omy is more important than political autonomy. This has certainly been 
a key argument in the decentralization and local autonomy literature: 
without local fiscal autonomy, true decentralization (and the efficiencies 
expected of it) cannot be realized (Agranoff, 2006). But whether it is an 
equal partner to institutional variables is a difficult question to answer, 
since the two are often intertwined. A locality may not have the right to 
decide whether it can raise local revenue if the national institutional struc-
ture does not allow it. This has certainly been the case in South Korea. 
However, the cases here seem to indicate that there is an additional set 
of variables that we should consider when investigating local autonomy 
and whether it carries more benefits than costs. Traditionally, the rights 
that must be given at the national level to subnational governing juris-
dictions cover four areas of decision-making: 1) time (when can revenue 
be raised); 2) purpose (for what can revenue be raised); 3) scale (how 
much revenue can be raised); and 4) process (how can revenue be raised) 
(Agranoff, 2006, p. 43). Of these four, local governments in South Korea 
exercise relatively little control, except perhaps for scale. Thus, any auton-
omy in the generation of revenue is closely tied to a local government’s 
economic circumstances. In South Korea, this is a perennial thorn in the 
side of the national government. One of its most consistent points for 
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political conflict is the perception of political favoritism, where the party 
in power offers more resources to its political friends, including those in 
industry. Such perceptions are holdovers from Korea’s history as develop-
mental state (Woo-Cummings, 1999), but they are strong enough to color 
popular opinion, and there is certainly ample evidence that the national 
government considers the perception of equity across jurisdictions to be 
important (Kim, 2016). So, politically, allowing economic differences to 
flourish from region to region can be a risky undertaking. Thus we might 
expect to see some paradoxical behavior with respect to political and eco-
nomic variables at the local levels. This may be especially true within a 
policy area such as immigration, where the national aims of labor policy 
may contradict (in political rhetoric) the economic goals of local govern-
ments.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
In general, the current administration of President Moon Jae-in is am-
bivalent about immigration and foreign labor. In a surprising move in 
2018, the government decided to uphold a controversial 2016 court rul-
ing that found bilingual education to be detrimental to children learning 
their native language (Ghani, 2018). In a reversal of a decades-old policy, 
the government has banned the teaching of English prior to the start of 
third grade of elementary schools. The court ruling was based primarily 
on highly contested testimony that justified the delay by arguing that for-
eign language acquisition at an early age pushed other, more important 
subjects to the side. Since the average amount of time elementary public 
school children spend in English language classes is approximately one 
hour per week, opponents of the measure argued that this was more a 
symbolic policy gesture than one which would truly affect the learning 
outcomes. 
The examination of the two cases here illustrates the importance of fiscal 
autonomy in allowing local jurisdictions the policy space necessary to ad-
dress local needs more efficiently. However, they also highlight ways in 
which political institutions, like parties, can mask differences that would 
otherwise prove detrimental to national cohesiveness. This political soli-
darity allows for some flexibility at the local level in areas that are not of 
major interest to the ruling party. The shortcomings of this examination 
are clear. These are two cases out of a population of seventeen, and thus 
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may not represent, in a generalizable way, the story of local autonomy in 
South Korea.
However, the purpose of this research was to establish a foundation for 
future efforts to explore further. By highlighting the importance of fiscal 
autonomy and policy distance, the case studies presented here offer food 
for thought in the larger questions of how local autonomy might play out 
in other arenas. These findings may be especially important for other uni-
tary governments attempting to transition to more decentralized models 
of governance.
Currently, local governments in South Korea are still trying to provide 
services for their foreign residents because they recognize the econom-
ic realities embedded in an export-oriented economy (Lee, 2015). And 
herein lies Korea’s unique predicament. It is a small nation, relative to its 
neighbors. Its very existence depends on balancing its relationships with 
the United States and China, its two largest trading partners, and the 
two nations most responsible for its security and stability in the region. 
Many see it as a pawn in a larger game of chess, but the South Koreans 
themselves struggle mightily to define their own place in this “bad neigh-
borhood”. This requires reimagining its own identity on a regular basis, 
maintaining some continuity between the past and the future. Language 
and culture are two of its strongest tools for creating a cohesive notion of 
Korean identity. Political uniformity, at least on the surface, is another. 
But as this examination of national-local conditions demonstrates, there 
is room for flexibility, especially when the economic demands of the pop-
ulation require it. As long as immigration does not threaten the national 
identity, foreign workers may continue to find their place within South 
Korea.
References
Agranoff, R. (2006). Autonomy, devolution and IGR. Regional and Federal Studies, 
14 (1): 26-65.
Arendt, H. (1958). The human condition. Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago 
Press.
Busan Metropolitan City (2018). Busan Foundation for International Coopera-
tion. Retrieved from: http://english.busan.go.kr/forecenter01.
Choi, Y. S., & Wright, D. S. (2004). Intergovernmental relations (IGR) in Korea 
and Japan: Phases, patterns and progress towards decentralisation. (local au-
tonomy) in a trans-Pacific context. International Review of Public Administra-
tion, 9(1): 1-22, https://doi.org/10.1080/12294659.2004.10805035
372





The Economist (2017). Why the jailbirds sing. Migrant workers in South Korea 
are often better off in prison. Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/
asia/2017/04/12/migrant-workers-in-south-korea-are-often-better-off-in-pris-
on.
The Economist (2017). Waiting to make their move. Asia’s looming labour short-
age. Retrieved from: https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/02/11/asias-loom-
ing-labour-shortage.
Edelman, M. (1967). The symbolic uses of politics. Urbana, Illinois, USA: University 
of Illinois Press.
Elazar, D. J. (1987). Exploring federalism. Tuscaloosa, USA: University of Ala-
bama Press.
Frederickson, H. G. (1980). New public administration. University, Alabama, 
USA: University of Alabama Press.
Ghani, F. (2018). South Korea bans English education for first and second graders. 
Al Jazeera English News. Retrieved from: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/south-korea-bans-english-education-graders-180302100352881.
html.
Gordon, S. (2016). A desire for isolation? Mass public attitudes in South Africa 
toward immigration levels. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 15(1): 18-
35, https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2016.1151096
Gyeonggi Provincial Government (2018). Gyeonggi information for foreigners. 
Retrieved from: https://english.gg.go.kr/.
Han, H. S. (2010). A study of social integration policy for marriage immigrants 
and multicultural families in Korea. IOM MRTC Working Paper Series, No 
2010-05.
Hepburn, E. & Rosie, M. (2014). Immigration, nationalism, and politics in Scot-
land. In E. Hepburn & R. Zapata-Barrero (Eds.), The politics of immigration 
in multi-level states: Governance and political parties, pp. 241-260, https://doi.
org/10.1057/9781137358530_12
Holtug, N., Lippert-Rasmussen, K., & Laegaard, S. (2009). Nationalism and multi-
culturalism in a world of immigration. London, United Kingdom: Palgrave-Mac-
millan, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377776
Jang, J. O. (2015). The SDGs and the social conditions for migrants in Korea. Goyang, 
Gyeonggi-do: International Organization for Migration, Migration and Re-
search Training Centre. Working Paper Series 2015-08.
Jeram, S. (2014). Sub-state nationalism and immigration in Spain: Diversity and 
identity in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Ethnopolitics, 13(3): 225-244, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2013.853998
Kang, S. H., & Yoo, G. S. (2011). Implications of the inflow of migrants and anal-
ysis on the Koreans’ attitude toward the support for migrants and their social 
participation. Family and Culture, 23(2): 46.
Kim, A. (2018). Social exclusion of multicultural families in Korea. Social Scienc-
es, 7(4), 63.
373























Kim, A. E. (2010). The origin of ethnic diversity in South Korea. OMNES: The 
Journal of Multicultural Society, 1(1), 85-105.
Kim, E. G. (2009). Demography, migration, and multiculturalism in South Korea. 
Asia-Pacific Journal, 7(6-2): 1-19.
Kim, J., & Kwon, Y. S. (2012). Economic development, the evolution of foreign 
labor and immigration policy, and the shift to multiculturalism in South Ko-
rea. Philippine Political Science Journal, 33(2), 178-201, https://doi.org/10.108
0/01154451.2012.734097
Kim, S. H. (2016). Participatory governance and policy diffusion in local governments 
in Korea: Implementation of participatory budgeting. Sejong, Korea: Korea De-
velopment Institute. Monograph 2016-01.
Kingdon, J. W. (2003). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. 2nd ed. New York, 
NY: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers – Longman Classics.
Koprić, I., Lalić Novak, G., & Vukojicic Tomic, T. (2019). Migrations, diversity, 
integration, and public povernance in Europe and beyond. Zagreb, Croatia: Insti-
tute of Public Administration.
Korean Immigration Service (2014). Vibrant Korea growing with immigrants. Ko-
rea Immigration Service.
Korea Research Institute for Local Government Administration [KRILA] 
(2015). Local government in Korea. Retrieved from: www.krila.re.kr/eng-
lish/?code=govern&subp=0101.
Korean Statistical Information Service [KOSIS] (2018). Population, households, 
and housing units: Population census. Multiple years. Retrieved from: http://
kosis.kr/eng/statisticsList/statisticsList_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT_ETITLE&par-
entId=A#SubCont.
Korean Statistical Information Service [KOSIS] (2019). Korean statistical da-
tabase. Multiple tables. Retrieved from: http://kosis.kr/eng/statisticsList/
statisticsListIndex.do?menuId=M_01_01&vwcd=MT_ETITLE&par-
mTabId=M_01_01#SelectStatsBoxDiv
Kwon, O. S. (2003). The effects of fiscal decentralization on public spending: 
The Korean case. Public Budgeting and Finance, 23(4): 1-20, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.0275-1100.2003.02304001.x
Laegaard, S. (2009). Liberal nationalism on immigration. In N. Holtug, K. Lip-
pert-Rasmussen, & S. Laergaard (Eds.), Nationalism and multiculturalism in 
a world of immigration. London. United Kingdom: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 
1-20, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230377776
Lee, J. H., & Hwang, W. J. (2012). Partisan effects of voter turnout in Korea elec-
tions, 1992-2010. Asian Survey, 52(6): 1161-1182, https://doi.org/10.1525/
as.2012.52.6.1161
Lee, S. J. (2015). The roles of local governments and non-governmental organiza-
tions for the local-based migrant policy. IOM MRTC Working Paper Series, 
No 2015-06.
Lee, J. Y. & Tao, J. L. (2012). Fiscal stress and its impacts of local expenditure 
autonomy. The Korean Journal of Local Government Studies, 16(3): 235-247. 
374





Lipsky, M. (1980). Street level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in pub-
lic services. New York, USA: Russell Sage Foundation, https://doi.
org/10.1177/003232928001000113
Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, Republic of Korea (2018). Statistical 
yearbook of immigration and foreign policy. Retrieved from: www.korea.kr/ar-
chive/expDocView.do?docid=38330&call_from=rsslink.
Ministry of Justice (2007). Act on the treatment of foreigners in Korea. Kyung-
gi-do: Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea.
Ministry of Justice (2008). The first basic plan for immigration policy: 2008–2012. 
Kyunggi-do: Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea
Ministry of Justice (2015). Current status check of migration policy and future policy 
for improvement. Gyeonggi-do: Korean Immigration Service of the Ministry of 
Justice: 3.
Ministry of Justice (2017). Korea Immigration Service Statistics 2016. Kyung-
gi-do: Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea.
Moon, C. S. (1999). Local government in Korea. Seoul. South Korea: Korea Local 
Authorities Foundation for International Relations.
National Election Commission (2018). Local election autonomy: A study (Jibang 
bunkwun chinhwajeokin seonkeojedo yeongu). Korea Policy Group: Im Jeongbin, 
Principal.
Oh, J. E., Kang, D. K., Shin, J. J., Lee, S. L., Lee, S. B., & Chung, K. (2012). 
Migration profile of the Republic of Korea. IOM MRTC Research Report Series 
2011-01.
Organization for Economic and Community Development (OECD) (2019). Fer-
tility rates (indicator). Retrieved from: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-is-
sues-migration-health/fertility-rates/indicator/english_8272fb01-en, https://
doi.org/10.1787/5f958f71-en
Park, S. B. (2017). South Korea carefully tests the waters on immigration, with 
a focus on temporary workers. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from: 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/south-korea-carefully-tests-wa-
ters-immigration-focus-temporary-workers.
Peberdy, S. (2009). Selecting immigrants: National identity and South Africa’s immi-
gration policies, 1900-2008. Johannesburg, South Africa: Witwatersrand Uni-
versity Press. 
Pitschel, D., & Bauer, M. W. (2009). Subnational governance approach-
es on the rise – Reviewing a decade of eastern European regionaliza-
tion research. Regional and Federal Studies, 19(3): 327-347, https://doi.
org/10.1080/13597560902957450 
Ragin, C. C. (1987). The comparative method. Berkeley, California, USA: Univer-
sity of California Press.
Schattschneider, E. E. (1960). The semisovereign people: A realist’s view on democracy 
in America. Boston, USA: Wadsworth Publishers.
Stratfor (2017). Trade Profile: South Korea’s transformation from ‘Hermit King-
dom’ to economic power”. Worldview. Assessments, No. 5. Retrieved from: 
375

























Tao, J. L. (2016). Local discretion and environmental policy making in South 
Korea. Korea Journal of Policy Studies, 31(3): 1-26.
Torneo, A. R. (2016). Immigration policies and the factors of migration from de-
veloping countries to South Korea: An empirical analysis. International Migra-
tion, 54(3), 139-158, https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12246
Torneo, A. R., & Yang, S. B. (2015). Policy dissonance and the challenges of 
managing the impacts of South Korea’s industrial and demographic transition 
through immigration. International Journal of Technology, Policy and Manage-
ment, 15(1), 95-111, https://doi.org/10.1504/ijtpm.2015.067786
United Nations Children’s Fund [UNICEF] (2013). Republic of Korea: Migra-
tion Profiles. New York, USA: UNICEF.
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [UN-
ESCAP] (2016). Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2016: 
Nurturing productivity for inclusive growth and sustainable development. Bangkok, 
Thailand: UNESCAP, https://doi.org/10.18356/61f9a0b9-en
Watson, I. (2012). Paradoxical multiculturalism in South Korea. Asian Politics & 
Policy, 4(2), pp. 233-258, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2012.01338.x
NATIONAL-LOCAL NETWORKS AND IMMIGRATION 
GOVERNANCE: POLICY DISTANCE IN SOUTH KOREA
Summary 
The ability to regulate the flow of goods, capital and people across borders is one 
of the defining characteristics of nation-state political power. But there is not 
always agreement between the central government and local officials as to the 
desirability of immigration, where local governments may desire greater, or fewer, 
numbers of immigrants, depending on the local economy and labor needs. In 
South Korea, a unitary form of government offers an opportunity to examine the 
policy distance between the national government’s stance on immigration based 
on the politics of the ruling party, and the attitudes of local officials who work for 
metropolitan-level governments (those with a population of one million or more). 
I look at the impact of local economic market needs on local attitudes towards 
national immigration policy through the lens of intergovernmental relations and 
Lipsky’s concept of bureaucratic discretion. Comparing two cases drawn from 
local governments in South Korea with dissimilar economic bases but similar lev-
els of local autonomy, I find that economic needs at the local level are addressed 
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by local approaches to immigration policy. Contrary to expectations, the cases 
illustrate the relative importance of fiscal autonomy and a new understanding 
for political autonomy. These cases illustrate the need for caution when applying 
political and institutional theory within new contexts and offer new variables for 
future investigations of local autonomy.
Keywords: immigration, local politics, policy distance, local autonomy, inter-
governmental relations, local labor markets, South Korea
CENTRALNO-LOKALNE MREŽE I UPRAVLJANJE IMIGRACIJOM: 
UDALJENOST JAVNIH POLITIKA SREDIŠNJE I LOKALNIH VLASTI 
U JUŽNOJ KOREJI
Sažetak
Regulacija prekograničnog protoka roba, kapitala i ljudi jedna je od bitnih 
značajki političke moći neke države. Međutim, središnja vlast i lokalni dužnos-
nici ne slažu se uvijek oko poželjnosti imigracije, jer lokalne vlasti mogu prižel-
jkivati veći ili manji broj useljenika, ovisno o strukturi lokalnog gospodarstva i 
potrebi za radnicima. Unitarni oblik vlasti u Južnoj Koreji omogućava prouča-
vanje udaljenosti javnih politika središnje vlasti, koja svoj stav prema imigraciji 
temelji na političkim idejama vladajuće stranke, i stavova lokalnih dužnosnika 
metropolitanskih gradova (onih s milijun i više stanovnika). Autorica analizira 
utjecaj potreba lokalnog gospodarstva na stavove lokalnih dužnosnika prema 
centralnoj imigracijskoj politici iz perspektive međurazinskih odnosa te kon-
cepta autonomije odlučivanja u javnoj upravi M. Lipskyja. Usporedbom dviju 
lokalnih jedinica iz Južne Koreje čije su gospodarske osnove različite, ali imaju 
sličan stupanj lokalne autonomije, utvrđeno je da se lokalnim gospodarskim 
potrebama prilazi razvijajući specifične lokalne pristupe imigracijskoj politi-
ci. Suprotno očekivanjima autorice, analiza je uputila na relativnu važnost 
fiskalne autonomije i jedno novo poimanje političke autonomije. Pokazalo se 
da je potreban oprez pri primjeni političke i institucionalne teorije u različitim 
kontekstima, ali i nove varijable za daljnje istraživanje lokalne autonomije.
Ključne riječi: imigracija, lokalne politike, udaljenost među javnim politika-
ma, lokalna autonomija, odnosi pojedinih razina vlasti (međurazinski odnosi), 
lokalna tržišta rada, Južna Koreja 
